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Arbitrage Asymmetry and the Idiosyncratic Volatility Puzzle

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The Idiosyncratic Volatility Puzzle

- ► IVOL: "Idiosyncratic" volatility not due to systematic risk
- Long-standing question: Is expected return related to IVOL?
- Empirical evidence:
 - No relation

Fama and MacBeth (1973), Bali and Cakici (2008)

- Positive relation
 Lintner (1965), Tinic and West (1986), Lehmann (1990), Malkiel and
 Xu (2002), Fu (2009)
- Negative relation

Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang (2006, 2009), Jiang, Xu, and Yao (2009), Guo and Savickas (2010), Chen, Jiang, Xu, and Yao (2012)

Evidence of a negative relation, consistent with most recent studies, has been the most puzzling.

Proposed Explanations

The IVOL puzzle

- ▶ reflects lower disclosure (of negative information) ⇒ higher IVOL (Jiang, Xu, and Yao, 2009)
- is limited to firms with high institutional ownership and shorting (Boehme, Danielson, Kumar, and Sorescu, 2009)
- reflects negative relation between expected return and idiosyncratic skewness (Boyer, Mitton, and Vorkink, 2010)
- reflects a preference for lotteries (Bali, Cakici, and Whitelaw, 2011)
- ▶ reflects return reversal (Huang, Liu, Rhee, and Zhang, 2010)
- reflects systematic risk exposure proxied by IVOL (Barinov, 2011; Chen and Petkova, 2012)
- Possibly at work but challenged to explain our empirical findings.

Our Explanation of the IVOL Puzzle

- We combine two dimensions of arbitrage:
 - Arbitrage risk: higher IVOL \Rightarrow higher risk
 - Arbitrage asymmetry: shorting is different from purchasing
- Source of arbitrage asymmetry:
 - more long-only capital than long-short capital
 - short sellers face different risks
- IVOL versus expected return: depends on mispricing direction
- Among overpriced securities:
 - Greater arbitrage risk \Rightarrow greater overpricing
 - Negative IVOL effect in expected returns
- Among underpriced securities:
 - Greater arbitrage risk \Rightarrow greater underpricing
 - Positive IVOL effect in expected returns
- ► Arbitrage asymmetry ⇒ greater overpricing
- The negative IVOL effect among overpriced securities dominates in the overall cross section.

Empirical Results: Overview

- Relative mispricing measure, based on 11 anomalies
- Stratify stocks, from overpriced to underpriced
- Mispricing and IVOL effects:
 - Among overpriced stocks, negative IVOL effect
 - Among underpriced stocks, positive IVOL effect
 - Stronger IVOL effect among overpriced stocks
 - Negative IVOL effect in overall cross-section
- Investor sentiment proxy for market-wide mispricing tendency
- Time-Varying IVOL effects:
 - Negative IVOL effect among overpriced stocks is stronger following high sentiment
 - Positive IVOL effect among underpriced stocks is stronger following low sentiment
 - Stronger sentiment-related variation among overpriced stocks

Related Work

Supporting results of our explanation in other studies

- Long-short anomaly profits greater among high-IVOL stocks, especially short legs (Jin, 2012)
- Negative (positive) IVOL effect among the relatively overpriced (underpriced) stocks (Cao and Han, 2010)
- Negative returns on high-IVOL stocks after relaxing short-sale constraints (Doran, Jiang, and Peterson, 2012)

Asymmetric Capital and Risk-Bearing

- Less capital devoted to short positions than long positions
 ⇒ less capital to bear idiosyncratic risk of overpriced assets
 ⇒ more overpricing remains
- ► E.g., assume mean-variance investors with relative risk aversion *A*
 - L: long-only capital
 - B: long-short capital
 - y_i: noise trader holding of asset i (net of market supply)
- For assets held by the long-only capital:

$$\alpha_i \approx \frac{A}{L+B} y_i \sigma_{\epsilon,i}^2$$

For assets shorted by the long-short capital:

$$\alpha_i \approx \frac{A}{B} y_i \sigma_{\epsilon,i}^2$$

Asymmetric Risks

- Risks of short sellers and purchasers are not symmetric
- Greater risk of margin call
 - ⇒ shorts face greater "noise-trader" risk (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) - capital constraints necessitate closing an eventually profitable position
- Positive skewness in compounded returns produces greater tail risk for short sellers
- Risk of short squeezes

Asymmetric Risk of Margin Calls

Maintenance margin requirements apply to

m = equity/(position size)

- Consider a short seller and purchaser that begin with
 - identical equity and position sizes

▶ *m* = 50%

- Equal adverse percentage price changes produce
 - equal losses of equity for short seller and purchaser
 - decrease (increase) in position size for purchaser (short seller)
- ▶ With maintenance requirement m = 25% for long and short
 - purchaser receives margin call if price drops 33%
 - short seller receives margin call if price rises 20%
- With short maintenance instead m = 30% (e.g., FINRA)
 - short seller receives margin call if price rises 15.4%

Asymmetric Tail Risk

- Compounding induces positive skewness in multiperiod returns
- Positive return skewness \Rightarrow tail risk for short sellers
- An adverse move (loss)
 - decreases the exposure of a long position
 - increases the exposure of a short position
- Consider a short seller and purchaser with initially equal positions
- Their underlying monthly portfolio returns:
 - lognormal
 - standard deviation of return is 4%
 - after-cost expected return
 - 0.50% for purchaser
 - -0.50% for short seller
- For a 12-month horizon, the 1% VaR is 22% greater for the short seller

Identifying Mispricing

- Mispricing measure: average rankings for 11 return anomalies
- Anomalies: Relative to Fama-French three-factor model.
 - Failure probability
 - Ohlson's O-score
 - Net stock issues
 - Composite equity issues
 - Total accruals
 - Net operating assets
 - Momentum
 - Gross-profit-to-assets
 - Asset growth
 - Return-on-assets
 - Investment-over-assets
- ► Average monthly long-short alpha (decile 1 minus decile 10):
 - ▶ 1.48% based on the averaged rankings, versus
 - 0.86% for the average long-short anomaly alpha

Idiosyncratic Volatility and Portfolio Formation

- Compute IVOL for each stock using the most recent month's daily benchmark-adjusted returns
- Benchmarks are Fama-French (1993) factors: MKT, HML, SMB
- Form 25 portfolios:
 - Sort first on the mispricing measure, into 5 categories
 - Then sort on IVOL, into 5 categories
- Portfolio IVOL: same pattern as individual-stock IVOL
 - \Rightarrow differences in arbitrage risk survive diversification
- Portfolio IVOL versus direction of mispricing
 - U-shape, but asymmetric—steeper for overpricing
 - As expected if
 - arbitrage risk important for degree of mispricing
 - arbitrage asymmetry exists

Idiosyncratic Volatility for Double-Sorted Portfolios (Percent per month)

| | Highest | Next | Next | Next | Lowest |
|------------------|---------|------|------|------|--------|
| | IVOL | 20% | 20% | 20% | IVOL |
| Most overpriced | 4.43 | 3.55 | 3.18 | 3.06 | 2.49 |
| Next 20% | 3.71 | 2.92 | 2.37 | 2.13 | 2.12 |
| Next 20% | 3.37 | 2.65 | 2.22 | 2.17 | 2.05 |
| Next 20% | 3.74 | 2.55 | 2.06 | 1.77 | 1.80 |
| Most underpriced | 3.39 | 2.66 | 2.25 | 1.93 | 1.82 |

Mispricing and IVOL Effects

- "IVOL effect": relation between expected return and IVOL
- If arbitrage risk is important for mispricing, we expect
 - negative IVOL effect among overpriced stocks
 - positive IVOL effect among underpriced stocks
- If arbitrage asymmetry is important for mispricing, we expect the negative effect among overpriced stocks to be stronger.
 - $\Rightarrow\,$ Negative IVOL effect in overall cross section



IVOL Effects in Underpriced vs. Overpriced Stocks

(Benchmark-Adjusted Returns, Percent per Month)

| | Highest | Next | Next | Next | Lowest | Highest | All |
|-------------------|----------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|
| | IVOL | 20% | 20% | 20% | IVOL | -Lowest | Stocks |
| Most overpriced | -2.25 | -1.32 | -0.80 | -0.79 | -0.45 | -1.80 | -0.81 |
| (top 20%) | (-11.91) | (-8.72) | (-5.79) | (-5.31) | (-3.92) | (-8.28) | (-8.14) |
| Next 20% | -0.92 | -0.40 | -0.21 | -0.27 | -0.08 | -0.84 | -0.23 |
| | (-5.76) | (-3.00) | (-2.08) | (-2.83) | (-0.82) | (-4.33) | (-3.88) |
| Next 20% | -0.13 | 0.01 | 0.03 | -0.21 | 0.04 | -0.18 | -0.07 |
| | (-0.88) | (0.11) | (0.25) | (-2.15) | (0.48) | (-0.95) | (-1.47) |
| Next 20% | -0.07 | 0.08 | 0.23 | 0.21 | 0.15 | -0.23 | 0.18 |
| | (-0.42) | (0.69) | (2.54) | (2.69) | (1.93) | (-1.10) | (4.45) |
| Most underpriced | 0.68 | 0.66 | 0.41 | 0.31 | 0.10 | 0.57 | 0.28 |
| (bottom 20%) | (4.63) | (5.68) | (4.22) | (3.90) | (1.37) | (3.30) | (5.67) |
| Most overpriced – | -2.93 | -1 98 | -1 21 | -1 10 | -0 55 | -2 38 | -1 09 |
| most underpriced | (-12.31) | (-9.81) | (-6.53) | (-6.08) | (-3.69) | (-9.08) | (-8.05) |
| | . , | . , | . , | . , | ``` | . , | . , |
| All stocks | -0.69 | -0.12 | -0.00 | 0.05 | 0.08 | -0.78 | |
| | (-6.09) | (-1.56) | (-0.01) | (1.07) | (1.86) | (-5.50) | |

IVOL Effects in Underpriced vs. Overpriced Stocks

(Benchmark-Adjusted Returns, Percent per Month, Independent Sorts)

| | Highest | Next | Next | Next | Lowest | Highest | All |
|------------------------------------|----------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|
| | IVOL | 20% | 20% | 20% | IVOL | –Lowest | Stocks |
| Most overpriced | -1.89 | -0.95 | -0.72 | -0.47 | -0.39 | -1.50 | -0.81 |
| (top 20%) | (-12.05) | (-7.39) | (-4.90) | (-3.62) | (-3.04) | (-7.36) | (-8.14) |
| Next 20% | -0.88 | -0.41 | -0.31 | -0.21 | -0.04 | -0.84 | -0.23 |
| | (-5.86) | (-3.36) | (-3.00) | (-2.08) | (-0.44) | (-4.41) | (-3.88) |
| Next 20% | -0.09 | -0.01 | -0.05 | -0.12 | 0.02 | -0.10 | -0.07 |
| | (-0.53) | (-0.09) | (-0.48) | (-1.29) | (0.18) | (-0.53) | (-1.47) |
| Next 20% | -0.15 | 0.07 | 0.17 | 0.18 | 0.23 | -0.38 | 0.18 |
| | (-0.80) | (0.63) | (1.87) | (2.33) | (3.22) | (-1.78) | (4.45) |
| Most underpriced | 0.56 | 0.68 | 0.51 | 0.33 | 0.14 | 0.41 | 0.28 |
| (bottom 20%) | (3.27) | (4.91) | (5.02) | (4.10) | (2.04) | (2.16) | (5.67) |
| Most overpriced – most underpriced | -2.44 | -1.63 | -1.23 | -0.81 | -0.53 | -1.91 | -1.09 |
| | (-11.07) | (-8.65) | (-6.43) | (-5.02) | (-3.43) | (-7.62) | (-8.05) |

Time-Varying Mispricing

- Evidence of greater overpricing when sentiment is high
 - Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan (JFE, 2012)
- Investor sentiment index (Baker-Wurgler)
 - Indicator of market-wide direction of mispricing
 - Principal component of six underlying measures:
 - closed-end fund discount
 - number of IPO's
 - first-day IPO returns
 - NYSE turnover
 - equity share of new issues
 - dividend premium (log B/M, payers minus nonpayers)



Combined Anomaly Strategy: \$100 Long + \$100 Short Annualized Profit (\$)



High Sentiment minus Low Sentiment Annualized Profit (\$) Per \$100



Time-Varying IVOL Effects

- If the degree and direction of mispricing vary over time, so should IVOL effects.
- We expect
 - (1) greater negative IVOL effect among overpriced stocks following high sentiment
 - (2) greater positive IVOL effect among underpriced stocks following low sentiment
- Arbitrage asymmetry \Rightarrow (1) should be stronger than (2)



IVOL Effects in High- vs. Low-Sentiment Periods

(Benchmark-Adjusted Returns, Percent per Month)

| | | | | | | | High-Se | ntiment | Periods – |
|------------------------------------|---------|----------|---------|---------|----------|-----------|---------|----------|-----------|
| | High-Se | entiment | Periods | Low-Se | entiment | : Periods | Low-S | entiment | t Periods |
| | Highest | Lowest | Highest | Highest | Lowest | Highest | Highest | Lowest | Highest |
| | IVOL | IVOL | -Lowest | IVOL | IVOL | -Lowest | IVOL | IVOL | -Lowest |
| Most overpriced | -2.84 | -0.54 | -2.30 | -1.66 | -0.36 | -1.30 | -1.18 | -0.18 | -1.00 |
| (top 20%) | (-9.57) | (-3.13) | (-6.79) | (-6.91) | (-2.55) | (-4.75) | (-3.06) | (-0.86) | (-2.29) |
| Next 20% | -1.24 | -0.01 | -1.23 | -0.60 | -0.16 | -0.44 | -0.64 | 0.15 | -0.79 |
| | (-5.28) | (-0.04) | (-4.31) | (-2.77) | (-1.26) | (-1.71) | (-2.02) | (0.82) | (-2.07) |
| Next 20% | -0.17 | 0.31 | -0.48 | -0.10 | -0.22 | 0.13 | -0.07 | 0.53 | -0.60 |
| | (-0.72) | (2.34) | (-1.75) | (-0.54) | (-1.92) | (0.52) | (-0.25) | (3.09) | (-1.68) |
| Next 20% | -0.10 | 0.19 | -0.29 | -0.04 | 0.11 | -0.16 | -0.06 | 0.08 | -0.14 |
| | (-0.35) | (1.44) | (-0.84) | (-0.23) | (1.29) | (-0.75) | (-0.18) | (0.49) | (-0.34) |
| Most underpriced | 0.54 | 0.33 | 0.21 | 0.82 | -0.12 | 0.94 | -0.28 | 0.45 | -0.73 |
| (bottom 20%) | (2.43) | (2.77) | (0.77) | (4.05) | (-1.21) | (4.16) | (-0.93) | (2.85) | (-2.03) |
| Most overpriced – most underpriced | -3.38 | -0.87 | -2.51 | -2.48 | -0.24 | -2.24 | -0.90 | -0.63 | -0.27 |
| | (-9.36) | (-4.02) | (-6.48) | (-7.82) | (-1.22) | (-6.60) | (-1.85) | (-2.23) | (-0.53) |
| All stocks | -1.06 | 0.26 | -1.32 | -0.33 | -0.10 | -0.23 | -0.72 | 0.36 | -1.09 |
| | (-5.75) | (3.81) | (-5.88) | (-2.45) | (-1.87) | (-1.35) | (-3.16) | (4.16) | (-3.82) |

IVOL Effects and Sentiment: Predictive Regressions

 $R_{i,t} = a + bS_{t-1} + cMKT_t + dSMB_t + eHML_t + u_t,$

| | Highe | Highest IVOL | | st IVOL | Highe | Highest-Lowest | | |
|--------------------------------------|-------|--------------|-------|---------|-------|----------------|--|--|
| | ĥ | t-stat. | ĥ | t-stat. | ĥ | t-stat. | | |
| Most overpriced (top 20%) | -0.78 | -3.74 | 0.01 | 0.08 | -0.79 | -3.49 | | |
| Next 20% | -0.40 | -2.50 | 0.09 | 0.97 | -0.48 | -2.50 | | |
| Next 20% | -0.10 | -0.74 | 0.30 | 3.20 | -0.40 | -2.18 | | |
| Next 20% | -0.13 | -0.81 | 0.05 | 0.60 | -0.18 | -0.93 | | |
| Most underpriced (bottom 20%) | -0.12 | -0.92 | 0.16 | 1.81 | -0.28 | -1.80 | | |
| Most overpriced $-$ most underpriced | -0.66 | -2.76 | -0.15 | -1.12 | -0.50 | -2.20 | | |
| All stocks | -0.48 | -3.92 | 0.18 | 3.77 | -0.66 | -4.25 | | |

Exploring Macroeconomic Effects

- Sentiment may well be related to macro conditions.
- One can nevertheless ask whether macro factors play a role here.
- Baker and Wurgler also construct a version of their index the removes variation related to six macro variables:
 - growth in industrial production
 - growth in durable consumption
 - growth in nondurable consumption
 - growth in services consumption
 - growth in employment
 - NBER recession flag
- If we use that index instead of the original, the results are very similar.

IVOL Effects and Sentiment: Predictive Regressions with Macro-Adjusted Sentiment

 $R_{i,t} = a + b\tilde{S}_{t-1} + cMKT_t + dSMB_t + eHML_t + u_t,$

| | Highes | st IVOL | Lowes | t IVOL | Highest | Lowest |
|--|--------|---------|-------|---------|---------|----------------------------|
| | ĥ | t-stat. | ĥ | t-stat. | ĥ | t-stat. |
| Most overpriced (top 20%) | -0.74 | -3.56 | 0.03 | 0.28 | -0.76 | -3.42 |
| Next 20% | -0.45 | -2.89 | 0.08 | 0.92 | -0.53 | -2.81 |
| Next 20% | -0.17 | -1.24 | 0.29 | 3.10 | -0.46 | -2.49 |
| Next 20% | -0.17 | -1.12 | 0.04 | 0.52 | -0.22 | -1.14 |
| Most underpriced (bottom 20%) | -0.20 | -1.54 | 0.15 | 1.63 | -0.35 | -2.22 |
| ${\sf Most \ overpriced} \ - \ {\sf most \ underpriced}$ | -0.54 | -2.28 | -0.12 | -0.87 | -0.42 | -1.88 |
| All stocks | -0.52 | -4.31 | 0.17 | 3.53 | -0.69 | -4.50 |

Controlling for Additional Macro Variables

- We include five additional variables in the predictive regression:
 - yield spread between BAA and AAA bonds
 - yield spread between 20-year and 1-year Treasuries
 - 30-day T-Bill rate minus inflation rate
 - surplus consumption ratio (Campbell and Cochrane, 1999, Wachter 2006)
 - consumption-wealth variable Cay (Lettau and Ludvigson, 2001)
- Previously identified as being related to expected stock returns
- Results are again very similar.

IVOL Effects and Sentiment: Predictive Regressions with Additional Macro Variables

$$R_{i,t} = a + b\tilde{S}_{t-1} + cMKT_t + dSMB_t + eHML_t + \sum_{j=1}^6 m_j X_{j,t-1} + u_t,$$

| | Highest IVOL | | Lowes | st IVOL | Highest | Highest – Lowest | |
|--|--------------|---------|-------|---------|---------|------------------|--|
| | ĥ | t-stat. | ĥ | t-stat. | ĥ | t-stat. | |
| Most overpriced (top 20%) | -0.64 | -2.68 | -0.08 | -0.67 | -0.56 | -2.15 | |
| Next 20% | -0.46 | -2.52 | 0.04 | 0.41 | -0.50 | -2.29 | |
| Next 20% | -0.10 | -0.65 | 0.25 | 2.56 | -0.35 | -1.73 | |
| Next 20% | -0.09 | -0.49 | 0.09 | 0.97 | -0.17 | -0.83 | |
| Most underpriced (bottom 20%) | -0.18 | -1.21 | 0.07 | 0.70 | -0.24 | -1.42 | |
| ${\sf Most \ overpriced \ - \ most \ underpriced}$ | -0.46 | -1.75 | -0.14 | -0.94 | -0.32 | -1.25 | |
| All stocks | -0.50 | -3.58 | 0.15 | 2.84 | -0.65 | -3.69 | |

Estimating the Role of Mispricing

In each month t, estimate a cross-sectional regression containing a piecewise-linear function:

$$r_{t+1,i}^e = \beta_0 + f_t(M_{t,i})\sigma_{t,i} + \epsilon_{t+1,i},$$

where

$$f_t(M) = \sum_{k=1}^n I(\theta_{k-1,t} \leq M < \theta_{k,t}) \times (a_{k,t} + b_{k,t}M),$$

 $a_{k,t} + b_{k,t}\theta_{k,t} = a_{k+1,t} + b_{k+1,t}\theta_{k,t}, \quad [\theta_0 \ \theta_n] = [0 \ 100\%]$ \blacktriangleright Compute $f(M) = (1/T) \sum_{t=1}^T f_t(M)$

Also average separately over high- and low-sentiment months





Excluding Smaller Firms

- Smaller firm size
 - higher IVOL
 - greater overpricing
- Explore sensitivity to excluding smaller firms
- Continue to observe
 - Direction and strength of IVOL effect depend on mispricing
 - IVOL effect among overpriced stocks is significantly negatively related to investor sentiment
- IVOL effect among underpriced stocks also remains negatively related to sentiment, but significance drops

IVOL Effects Under Thresholds for Market Capitalization

| | Highest | Next | Next | Next | Lowest | Highest | All | | | |
|--------------------------------------|------------------|------------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|------------------|---------|--|--|--|
| | IVOL | 20% | 20% | 20% | IVOL | -Lowest | Stocks | | | |
| Panel A: 20% Smallest Stocks Deleted | | | | | | | | | | |
| Most overpriced | -2.15 | -1.29 | -0.84 | -0.75 | -0.46 | -1.69 | -0.80 | | | |
| (top 20%) | (-11.08) | (-8.59) | (-6.04) | (-5.02) | (-3.91) | (-7.69) | (-7.98) | | | |
| Next 20% | -0.89 | -0.40 | -0.25 | -0.30 | -0.10 | -0.79 | -0.26 | | | |
| | (-5.72) | (-2.92) | (-2.51) | (-3.12) | (-1.03) | (-4.16) | (-4.33) | | | |
| Next 20% | -0.13 | 0.07 | 0.05 | -0.15 | 0.04 | -0.17 | -0.05 | | | |
| | (-0.89) | (0.67) | (0.49) | (-1.55) | (0.46) | (-0.93) | (-1.15) | | | |
| Next 20% | -0.04 | 0.11 | 0.21 | 0.22 | 0.13 | -0.17 | 0.16 | | | |
| | (-0.22) | (1.06) | (2.25) | (2.72) | (1.68) | (-0.87) | (4.06) | | | |
| Most underpriced | 0.68 | 0.67 | 0.40 | 0.30 | 0.11 | 0.58 | 0.29 | | | |
| (bottom 20%) | (4.40) | (5.92) | (4.12) | (3.67) | (1.39) | (3.14) | (5.77) | | | |
| Most overpriced – | -2.83 | -1.96 | -1.23 | -1.05 | -0.56 | -2.27 | -1.09 | | | |
| Most underpriced | (-11.46) | (-9.80) | (-6.67) | (-5.72) | (-3.70) | (-8.43) | (-7.98) | | | |
| All stocks | -0.69 (-6.13) | -0.05 (-0.69) | 0.03 (0.46) | 0.02 (0.51) | 0.09 (2.02) | -0.78 (-5.56) | | | | |

IVOL Effects Under Thresholds for Market Capitalization

| | Highest | Next | Next | Next | Lowest | Highest | All |
|-------------------|------------------|------------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|------------------|---------|
| | IVOL | 20% | 20% | 20% | IVOL | -Lowest | Stocks |
| | Pane | el B: 40% | Smallest S | tocks Dele | eted | | |
| Most overpriced | -2.02 | -1.23 | -0.77 | -0.69 | -0.44 | -1.58 | -0.78 |
| (top 20%) | (-10.59) | (-7.92) | (-4.91) | (-4.82) | (-3.80) | (-7.11) | (-7.71) |
| Next 20% | -0.85 | -0.33 | -0.36 | -0.27 | -0.05 | -0.81 | -0.25 |
| | (-5.61) | (-2.57) | (-3.38) | (-2.86) | (-0.46) | (-4.21) | (-4.17) |
| Next 20% | -0.01 | 0.07 | 0.06 | -0.15 | 0.04 | -0.05 | -0.03 |
| | (-0.10) | (0.67) | (0.56) | (-1.61) | (0.45) | (-0.31) | (-0.74) |
| Next 20% | 0.01 | 0.13 | 0.17 | 0.25 | 0.14 | -0.12 | 0.17 |
| | (0.09) | (1.22) | (1.83) | (3.14) | (1.74) | (-0.65) | (4.02) |
| Most underpriced | 0.74 | 0.58 | 0.33 | 0.33 | 0.11 | 0.63 | 0.28 |
| (bottom 20%) | (5.05) | (5.38) | (3.51) | (4.11) | (1.35) | (3.57) | (5.66) |
| Most overpriced – | -2.76 | -1.80 | -1.11 | -1.02 | -0.55 | -2.21 | -1.06 |
| Most underpriced | (-11.93) | (-9.00) | (-5.56) | (-5.66) | (-3.58) | (-8.59) | (-7.75) |
| All stocks | -0.63 (-5.63) | -0.03 (-0.39) | 0.08 (1.46) | 0.01 (0.25) | 0.10 (2.19) | -0.73 (-5.20) | |

IVOL Effects Under Thresholds for Market Capitalization

| | Highest | Next | Next | Next | Lowest | Highest | All | | | |
|--------------------------------------|------------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|------------------|---------|--|--|--|
| | IVOL | 20% | 20% | 20% | IVOL | -Lowest | Stocks | | | |
| Panel C: 60% Smallest Stocks Deleted | | | | | | | | | | |
| Most overpriced | -1.67 | -1.05 | -0.66 | -0.58 | -0.41 | -1.25 | -0.71 | | | |
| (top 20%) | (-9.02) | (-6.69) | (-4.11) | (-4.58) | (-3.64) | (-5.96) | (-7.37) | | | |
| Next 20% | -0.62 | -0.26 | -0.30 | -0.16 | -0.04 | -0.58 | -0.21 | | | |
| | (-4.03) | (-2.29) | (-2.84) | (-1.59) | (-0.41) | (-2.94) | (-3.65) | | | |
| Next 20% | 0.08 | 0.12 | 0.02 | -0.14 | 0.06 | 0.02 | -0.01 | | | |
| | (0.62) | (1.15) | (0.21) | (-1.45) | (0.63) | (0.14) | (-0.31) | | | |
| Next 20% | 0.11 | 0.19 | 0.06 | 0.35 | 0.19 | -0.07 | 0.17 | | | |
| | (0.83) | (1.88) | (0.61) | (4.03) | (2.15) | (-0.46) | (3.69) | | | |
| Most underpriced | 0.71 | 0.59 | 0.31 | 0.31 | 0.10 | 0.60 | 0.28 | | | |
| (bottom 20%) | (4.91) | (5.42) | (3.02) | (3.70) | (1.28) | (3.43) | (5.39) | | | |
| Most overpriced – | -2.37 | -1.64 | -0.97 | -0.89 | -0.52 | -1.86 | -1.00 | | | |
| Most underpriced | (-10.89) | (-7.94) | (-4.72) | (-5.17) | (-3.44) | (-7.89) | (-7.41) | | | |
| All stocks | -0.44 (-3.94) | 0.00 (0.06) | 0.01 (0.26) | 0.06 (1.29) | 0.09 (1.98) | -0.53 (-3.79) | | | | |

IVOL Effects Under Market-Capitalization Thresholds

| | Highest | Next | Next | Next | Lowest | Highest | All | | | |
|--------------------------------------|------------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|------------------|---------|--|--|--|
| | IVOL | 20% | 20% | 20% | IVOL | -Lowest | Stocks | | | |
| Panel D: 80% Smallest Stocks Deleted | | | | | | | | | | |
| Most overpriced | -1.18 | -0.83 | -0.56 | -0.45 | -0.30 | -0.88 | -0.59 | | | |
| (top 20%) | (-6.28) | (-4.90) | (-3.76) | (-3.34) | (-2.57) | (-4.09) | (-6.02) | | | |
| Next 20% | -0.44 | -0.21 | -0.21 | -0.16 | 0.06 | -0.50 | -0.17 | | | |
| | (-3.00) | (-1.98) | (-1.99) | (-1.49) | (0.59) | (-2.57) | (-3.15) | | | |
| Next 20% | 0.06 | 0.12 | 0.08 | -0.01 | 0.09 | -0.03 | 0.05 | | | |
| | (0.45) | (1.15) | (0.73) | (-0.08) | (0.95) | (-0.17) | (0.97) | | | |
| Next 20% | 0.16 | -0.02 | 0.18 | 0.26 | 0.13 | 0.03 | 0.15 | | | |
| | (1.26) | (-0.16) | (1.77) | (2.86) | (1.38) | (0.18) | (2.89) | | | |
| Most underpriced | 0.54 | 0.56 | 0.34 | 0.32 | 0.06 | 0.48 | 0.28 | | | |
| (bottom 20%) | (3.75) | (5.20) | (3.22) | (3.56) | (0.71) | (2.62) | (4.96) | | | |
| Most overpriced – | -1.72 | -1.39 | -0.90 | -0.77 | -0.36 | -1.35 | -0.87 | | | |
| Most underpriced | (-7.47) | (-6.33) | (-4.64) | (-4.16) | (-2.33) | (-5.32) | (-6.28) | | | |
| All stocks | -0.28 (-2.58) | 0.05 (0.86) | 0.02 (0.33) | 0.09 (1.84) | 0.09 (1.73) | -0.37 (-2.59) | | | | |

IVOL Effects and Sentiment Under Market-Capitalization Thresholds

| | Highe | st IVOL | Lowes | t IVOL | Highest | Lowest |
|----------------------------------|----------|-------------|------------|---------|---------|----------------------------|
| | ĥ | t-stat. | ĥ | t-stat. | ĥ | t-stat. |
| Panel | A: 20% S | Smallest St | ocks Delet | ed | | |
| Most overpriced (top 20%) | -0.79 | -3.82 | 0.00 | 0.04 | -0.79 | -3.54 |
| Next 20% | -0.44 | -2.83 | 0.10 | 1.10 | -0.53 | -2.80 |
| Next 20% | -0.11 | -0.84 | 0.31 | 3.38 | -0.42 | -2.41 |
| Next 20% | -0.10 | -0.65 | 0.08 | 0.95 | -0.18 | -0.97 |
| Most underpriced (bottom 20%) | -0.07 | -0.52 | 0.14 | 1.50 | -0.20 | -1.29 |
| Most overpriced-most underpriced | -0.72 | -3.07 | -0.13 | -0.95 | -0.59 | -2.62 |
| All stocks | -0.46 | -3.80 | 0.18 | 3.76 | -0.64 | -4.15 |
| Panel | B: 40% S | Smallest St | ocks Delet | ed | | |
| Most overpriced (top 20%) | -0.83 | -4.03 | -0.02 | -0.24 | -0.80 | -3.56 |
| Next 20% | -0.38 | -2.31 | 0.15 | 1.60 | -0.53 | -2.58 |
| Next 20% | -0.19 | -1.48 | 0.31 | 3.13 | -0.50 | -2.80 |
| Next 20% | 0.01 | 0.11 | 0.12 | 1.53 | -0.11 | -0.61 |
| Most underpriced (bottom 20%) | -0.03 | -0.24 | 0.14 | 1.45 | -0.17 | -1.02 |
| Most overpriced-most underpriced | -0.79 | -3.45 | -0.16 | -1.12 | -0.63 | -2.79 |
| All stocks | -0.43 | -3.48 | 0.19 | 3.93 | -0.62 | -3.93 |

IVOL Effects and Sentiment Under Market-Capitalization Thresholds

| | Highest IVOL | | Lowest IVOL | | Highest – Lowest | | | | | | | |
|--------------------------------------|--------------|---------|-------------|---------|------------------|---------|--|--|--|--|--|--|
| | ĥ | t-stat. | ĥ | t-stat. | ĥ | t-stat. | | | | | | |
| Panel C: 60% Smallest Stocks Deleted | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Most overpriced (top 20%) | -0.78 | -3.86 | 0.04 | 0.39 | -0.81 | -3.77 | | | | | | |
| Next 20% | -0.33 | -2.14 | 0.11 | 1.23 | -0.44 | -2.25 | | | | | | |
| Next 20% | -0.01 | -0.09 | 0.27 | 2.64 | -0.29 | -1.51 | | | | | | |
| Next 20% | 0.03 | 0.21 | 0.14 | 1.73 | -0.11 | -0.70 | | | | | | |
| Most underpriced (bottom 20%) | 0.03 | 0.20 | 0.14 | 1.44 | -0.11 | -0.64 | | | | | | |
| Most overpriced-most underpriced | -0.80 | -3.46 | -0.10 | -0.70 | -0.70 | -3.23 | | | | | | |
| All stocks | -0.35 | -2.82 | 0.17 | 3.49 | -0.52 | -3.27 | | | | | | |
| Panel D: 80% Smallest Stocks Deleted | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Most overpriced (top 20%) | -0.80 | -3.87 | 0.11 | 0.94 | -0.91 | -3.93 | | | | | | |
| Next 20% | -0.34 | -2.29 | 0.18 | 1.75 | -0.52 | -2.63 | | | | | | |
| Next 20% | 0.00 | 0.01 | 0.29 | 2.82 | -0.29 | -1.52 | | | | | | |
| Next 20% | 0.02 | 0.16 | 0.16 | 1.76 | -0.14 | -0.85 | | | | | | |
| Most underpriced (bottom 20%) | 0.04 | 0.25 | 0.11 | 1.11 | -0.07 | -0.41 | | | | | | |
| Most overpriced-most underpriced | -0.84 | -3.37 | 0.00 | 0.01 | -0.84 | -3.28 | | | | | | |
| All stocks | -0.31 | -2.62 | 0.16 | 2.97 | -0.47 | -2.99 | | | | | | |

IVOL Effects and Institutional Ownership

- Short-sale impediments are likely to be more important among stocks with lower institutional ownership (IO)
- IO data from Thomson Financial Institutional Holdings (1980–2011)
- Compute the residuals in regression of logit IO on log size and (log size)² (following Nagel, 2005)
- Identify the top 30% and bottom 30% of firms based on residual IO
- Double sort on mispricing and IVOL within high-IO and low-IO groups

IVOL Effects for High and Low Institutional Ownership

| | High-IO Sample | | Low-IO Sample | | | Low-IO Sample | | | |
|-------------------|----------------|---------|---------------|---------|---------|---------------|---------|---------|---------|
| | Highest | Lowest | Highest | Highest | Lowest | Highest | Highest | Lowest | Highest |
| | IVOL | IVOL | -Lowest | IVOL | IVOL | -Lowest | IVOL | IVOL | -Lowest |
| Most overpriced | -1.84 | -0.75 | -1.09 | -3.09 | -0.22 | -2.87 | 1.25 | -0.53 | 1.78 |
| (top 20%) | (-5.39) | (-3.59) | (-2.55) | (-8.39) | (-1.10) | (-6.81) | (2.64) | (-2.14) | (3.26) |
| Next 20% | -0.80 | -0.01 | -0.79 | -1.51 | 0.22 | -1.73 | 0.71 | -0.23 | 0.94 |
| | (-2.88) | (-0.04) | (-2.46) | (-4.90) | (1.30) | (-4.74) | (1.70) | (-0.96) | (2.03) |
| Next 20% | 0.04 | 0.13 | -0.09 | -0.34 | 0.10 | -0.44 | 0.38 | 0.03 | 0.35 |
| | (0.14) | (0.82) | (-0.27) | (-1.02) | (0.61) | (-1.11) | (0.88) | (0.12) | (0.72) |
| Next 20% | 0.13 | 0.42 | -0.29 | -0.17 | 0.30 | -0.47 | 0.30 | 0.12 | 0.18 |
| | (0.53) | (2.91) | (-1.02) | (-0.56) | (1.91) | (-1.34) | (0.79) | (0.56) | (0.40) |
| Most underpriced | 0.70 | 0.16 | 0.54 | 0.41 | 0.15 | 0.25 | 0.29 | 0.01 | 0.28 |
| (bottom 20%) | (2.76) | (1.17) | (1.87) | (1.53) | (1.08) | (0.78) | (0.86) | (0.04) | (0.75) |
| | | | 1.60 | | o o= | | | | 4 = 0 |
| Most overpriced – | -2.53 | -0.91 | -1.62 | -3.49 | -0.37 | -3.12 | 0.96 | -0.54 | 1.50 |
| most underpriced | (-6.01) | (-3.43) | (-3.04) | (-8.25) | (-1.44) | (-6.34) | (1.73) | (-1.72) | (2.28) |
| All stocks | -0.56 | 0.18 | -0.73 | -1 14 | 0.15 | -1 28 | 0.58 | 0.03 | 0.55 |
| | (-3.10) | (1.99) | (-3.50) | (-5.12) | (1.56) | (-5.14) | (2.34) | (0.23) | (2.10) |
| | (5.10) | (1.55) | (5.50) | (3.12) | (1.50) | (3.14) | (2.5+) | (0.23) | (2.10) |

Conclusions

- Explain negative relation between expected return and idioscycratic volatility—the IVOL puzzle.
- Combine
 - Arbitrage risk
 - Arbitrage asymmetry
- IVOL effect depends on mispricing
 - negative among overpriced stocks
 - positive among underpriced stocks
 - the first of these is stronger
- IVOL effect varies over time
 - negative effect is greater following high sentiment
 - positive effect is greater following low sentiment
 - the first of these is stronger